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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH
'flllOKOL Clll·:~IICAL CORPORATit)~. a Corporation,
Pla·intiff-U('.-.;!)()IIrlcnf anrl Cross.11' 1wl!au I.
and
r~lTI•:D ~T.\TE~ OF

I

Al\fERICA, \ Case No. 9912

Plamt,iff-1 nterrfnor and Cross.·lpfJcl!anf
-v~.-

LE 0 R .\X DE PETERSON,

Defendant -Appellant

BRIEF

o~F INTERVENO~R

~TATEJIEXT

OF XATFRE OF THE CASE

Thi~ ca~e

involve:' the applicability and constitutionality of the l ~tab privilege tax, Sec-bon 59-13-73 of the
rtah Code . :\nnntnt(•(l, 1953, amended (Appendix, infra)/
H:' applied to property owned by the United States of
:\.merira and used by Thiokol Chemical Corporation in
the p~rformance ,of a Government research and development rontract.
1.

The Ctah Code Annotated is hereafter cited as U.C.A.

1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COrRrl1
This suit was commenced by Thiokol Chemical Corporation (hereafter called Thiokol) for the refund of
$125,801.29 in taxes paid under protest to Le Grande
Peterson, treasurer of Box Elder County. (R. 204-206.)
The United States is entitled to the full amount of any
refund (R. 249) and was accordingly granted leave to
intervene as a party pl,aintiff (R. 215). By their complaints, 'Thiokol and the United States sought a declaration that Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was unconstitutional
and a refund of the tax paid under that section on the
grounds that (1) the incidence of the tax was on the
United States; (2) Thoikol made no taxable use of and
had no taxable interest in the property assessed; (3)
the tax imposed by Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., when compared with the tax imposed on state-owned property
taxed under Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., discriminated against
the United States and those with whom it dealt; (4) Sectron 59-13-73, U.C.A., was applied in such a manner as to
discriminate against the United States and those with
whom it dealt. (R. 204-206, 216-218.) Trial was had
before the Honora:ble Lewis Jones, sitting without a
jury, in the First Judicial D~istrict Court, Box Elder
County, State of Utah. On April12, 1963, the court filed
i~ts findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding
judgment to Thiokol and the United States on the ground
that the statute was applied in such a manner as to discriminate against the United States and those with whom
it dealt. (R. 245-253.) However, the court ruled against
the other points urged by Throikol and the United States.
The defendant, Le Grande Peterson, appealed from this
2
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judgnwnt nml ~'hiokol and the r nited States crossnppt.>alt'(l from the court's failure to grant the prayed
t'111' dt>('lar·atory relief. (R. 255, 259.)

RELIEF HOFGHT ON APPEAL
1'1w F nitPd ::-;t:ates, as cross-appellant, seeks a de(•lnrntion that Section 59-13-73, P.C.A., is unconstitutional in that (1) it purports to tax users of federally-owned
property on the full value of such property, whereas coinpnrahlP n~Pr~ of state-owned property are tre,ated dift't>rently undt>r SPction 59-2-2, U.C.A., and (2) Thiokol
do~~ not havP a taxable interest in the property. ·The
Fnited ~tates, as respondent, urges the affirmance of
the trial court·~ ruling that Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was
applied in a manner that discriminated against the
tTnitl'd ~tates and those with whom it dealt. 2

ST..:\ TEThiENT OF FACT S
1

Tht> plaintiff, Thiokol Chemical Corporation (he,reafter ealled Thiokol), is a Delaware corporation that is
qualified to do business in the State of Utah and was in
t'aet doing business within the state during the year
1961. (H. ~45-~46.) Since 1957, a portion of Thiokol's
hu~iness has involved research and development on the
fir:-;t stage of the .Jiinuteman l\Iissile under a contract
entered into with the United States. (Ex. 6.) During
2. Although the United States has not argued in this brief
that the e.."{emption of charitable and religious organizations in
Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. renders that section unconstitutional, the
United States does not waive this point but refers to the argument as made in the brief submitted by Thiokol.

3
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1961, the taxable year in question, this research was conducted at Thiokol's Was·atch Division which i~ located
in Box Elder Oounty, Utah. (R. 68, 246.)

The contract between Thiokol and the United States
1s of the cost-plus-fixed-fee type and under its tenus
Thiokol's compensation is based on a percentage of the
original estimate of the total cost of performance. (R.
77, 246.) Under this type of contract any subsequent
cost saving will not reduce the compensation and any
increase in costs ov·er and above the original estimates
will not increase Thloikol's fee unless the increase is attributable to changes in the work or services to be perform·ed. The fee is thus completely fixed at the outset
of the contract and the efficiency or inefficiency which
Thiokol demonstrates in the use of the equipment furnished by the Government will not affect its profit.
(R. 77-78, 84.)
Thiokol is not free to decide for itself how to proceed
with the reseach and must obtain approval from the Air
Frorce Ballistic Systems Division (a division of the
United States Air Force) prior to embarking on -any
project. The United States maintains a staff of appro!XiInately sixty people at the Wasatch Division and United
States approval is required 'Of such items as: security
policies, s.afety measures, labor relations, accounting,
procurement, and the company's organizational struc-ture including wages and salaries. (R. 69-75.) The research and development activities ~of Thiokol relate to the
first stage of the missile only, stages two .and three being
the responsibility of other contractors and final a:ssembly
4
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occur~ at Boeing Plant 77, Hill ..:\ir Force Basr. (R. 1311~,~.) r;IP pfforts ol' all tlll'~l' contractors are coordinated
hy the Balli~tie~ ~y~tt:>ms Divi~ion which has technical
1'1':-'pon~ihilit,'> for ~PPing- that the total missile is operaitonnl.

( 1\. l ;, 1.)

ln <H'<'ordance with the terms of the contract, the
rnitt•d ~tate~ provided Thiokol "·ith machinery, equipuwnt arHl other personal property to be used in the
pt•rl'onnarH'l' of the contract. (R. 246; Exs. 1, 6.) This
propt~rty wa~ furnished without charge, and the contrad ~I>P<'i fieally provided that title to such property was
to remain in the United States. (Ex. 6.) The United
~tatl'~ reserved the right to divert any of the equipment
furni~lu•d to other uses at other locations (R. 72), although thi~ right was not exercised in 1961 (R. 73).
During the tax y<:>ar in question all of the property furni~lH•d by the l~nited States was used by Thiokol solely
in the performance of the contract. (R. 246.)
In the year 1961, an assessment in the aggregate
amount of $2+!,958.80 was made agaill'st Thiokol with
n·~tH'l't to certain properties located in Box Elder Cotmty. and of this anwunt $125,801.29 was assessed against
1)roperty title to which remained in the United States.
(Ex. 1.) On X oveinber 29,1961, Thiokol paid the total
n$~t·~~ment and protested that portion of the assessment
attributable to the property O"\\'Jled by the United States.
Thi::-: acti<m for the recovery of the protested tax was
then in::-:titnted against the defendant, Le Grande Peter~nn. treasurer of Box Elder County, Utah. (R. 204-206,
Ex. 1.) ~inee any recovery in tllis suit would inure to
5
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the benefit of the United States, the United States moved
to file a complaint in intervention and was granted leave
to intervene on August 28, 1962. (R. 215.) The complaints
of both Thioikol and the United States called into question the constitutionality of Section 59-13-73 and the Attorney General of U t.ah was notified of the proceeding
in accordanoe with Section '78-33-11, U.C.A. 'l'he Attorney General thereafter appeared and participated
throughout the proceeding. (R. 209-210.)
The case came to trial before the Honorable Lewis
Jones, District Judge, sitting in the District Court of
Box Elder County, Utah, and culminated in an award of
judgment for the United States and Thiokol on April12,
1963. (R. 252-253.) This judgment was predicated on
the trial court's conclusion that the United States had
proved ( R. 249) That defendant and other responsible taxing
officials of the State of Utah and Box Elder
County, in assessing and levying taxes for the
year 1961, discriminated against plaintiff, Thiokol Chemical Corp., and United States of America, intervenor, in the manner in which they construed, applied and enforced Section 59-13-73 of
the Utaih Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The evidence adduced at the trial bearing on this
finding can be divided into two distinct categories. First,
the evidence bearing on the practices and policies of the
taxing officials of Box Elder County in administering
Sections 59-2-2 and 59-13-73, U.C.A.; and, second, the
evidence illustrating the administration of these sections
on a state-wide basis.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The administration of Section 59-13-73 U.C.A.
by the taxing officials of Box Elder County.
.\ t the trial it wa~ proved that there were numerous
parreb of property that were leased or sold by the State
und local officials of Box Elder County which were subjPI't to tlw ta..x. impmwd by Section 59-13-73 but were not
taxed pur~nant to that ~Pction. These included several
pa t'<•Pl~ of real estate referred to as the "Brigham City
l'ropt-rtiP~" which wPre all leased or sold under contract
by the eity. Tlwy consist of lots 1, 15 and 16 of block
ti, Brigham City five-aerP plot in the N.W. 14 of section
1-l. 1.\ 9 and N. R. 2. W.S.L.M., known as the "Septic
Plant ~itt>" and approximately 16.75 acres in the S. Y2
of K\V. ~~of 'section 18. T. 9. N. R. 2. W.S.LM, known
a~ the "Gravel Pit Site"; and approximately 19.51 acres
owned by the Board of Education of the Box Elder
County School Distrid, an instrumentality of the County.
( R. :!-+7.) Although the court found (R. 247) that at least
part of eac.h 'of these properties were in the possession
of. and u~ed by, private individuals, associations, or
rorporations in connection with business conducted for a
profit, it was stipulated between the parties to this suit
that these properties were not taxed under Section 59-137:~ r.r.A., or any other provision of the Utah law (Ex.
1).

In addition, the parties stipulated that there were
upwards of 380 parcels of land in the State of Utah, title
to which remains in the State of Utah and which were
held by contract vendees under contracts of sale from the
state. (Ex. 1.) Pursuant to the provisions of Sections
59-5-;)0 and 59-5-51. U.C.A., the State Land Board an7
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nually prepared a list of these properties and forwarded
the list 1:o the State Tax Cmnmission which in turn sent
it to the local ass·essors. (R. 2-tG-2-1-7; Ex. 3.) The list
sent to the taxing officials of Box Elder Oounty for the
year 1961 contained 34 properties that were located within the limits of the County. The trial court found that
at least 27 of thHse properties were· used in a business
for profit and were in all other respects subject to the
provisions of Section 59-13-73, lT.C.A., but were not
taxed pursuant to that section. (R. 247-248.) To the extent that these properties were taxed at all, it was pursuant to Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., which taxes purchasers
of state lands on their equity interest only. (Ex. 1.)
Fred L. Peterson, County Assessor for Box Elder
County, was called on to explain his failure t'O assess any
of these propertie'S under Section 59'-13-73, U.G.A. As
to the "Brigham City Properties" he testified on direct
examination (R. 159-160) :

Q * * * Did you, in making your a:ssessment
for the year 1961, conduct any investigation as to
the properties owned by the· Board of Education
of Box Elder County, by the City of Brigham, or
any other municipalities of Box Elder County,
which were then under lease to private parties
and us-ed by those private parties in connection
with their businesses condueted for a profit~
A

No, sir.

Q You n1ade no such inves,tigation prior to
making the assessments for the year 1961 ~
A After it appeared in the name of the city
or the county it went off the tax rolls.
8
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Q Ami :·ou didn't stop to consider that perhap;-; that was leased to a private owner who wa~
u~in.!.!."

.:\

it in connection with a business?
I did not.

It i~ true that as to one parcel of property, the
"t:ra\·,·1 Pit ~itp,'' Jlr. Pet(·r~on had directed an inquiry
to the rtah ~tatP Tax Cominission and had be·en int'nnned that thP propert:· should be taxed under Section
;J!)-13-7:l, P.C ..:\. (R. 180; Ex. 9.) Nevertheless, this propt•rty wa:-: not taxed, t'he failure to tax being explained
n:-: nn m·pr~ight. 3
Jf r. P~·terson was also specifically examined with
rt't'PrPn<'P to the 3-l properties purchased from the State
h~· private individuals under a contract which provided
that title \nl~ to rPmain in the state. He stated that
:-;nch properties Wt're taxed on the purchasers' equity
intPn':-;t only ann that no investigation had been made
tn determine ,,·hether any of the purchasers used the
property in connection with a business conducted for a
profit. (R. 1:JI -138.)
Xo PYidence was produced at the trial that Fred L.
Peterson, County Assessor for Box Elder County, had
H:':'t':'~ed any property within that County under S.eetion
;~~L 1:~- ~~~. l ~.l'.A., with the single exception of the property
ownPd by the Fnited States and used by Thiokol.
3. It is only in connection with this failure to tax the
gravel pit site that Mr. Peterson testified there was an oversight.
~ppellant's suggestion that the failure to tax all of these properties was due to an oversight is not supported by this testimony.
(Br. 9: R. 179-180.)

9
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The discriminatory application of Section 59-1373, U.C.A., on a state-wide basis.

The evidence introduced at the trial concerning the
State-wide failure to apply Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., to
many properties that were properly subject to its terms
was voluminous. The series of special use leases were
introduced and the eourt found (R. 247) that nine of
these leases (Exs. 1-c, 1-h, 1-i, 1-j, 1-o, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u, and
1-v; (R. 247) wer:e for lands leased to private individuals
or corporations in business for a profit. Of these special
use le·ases in evidence, only five were taxed under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. (Exs. 1-c, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u, and 1-v; R.
247-248.) The leases that were taxed appeared t'O be all
owned by utilitie~s subject to the taxing jurisdiction of
the State Tax Commission itself rather than the County
assessors. (R. 97-98, 138.)
In addition to the special use leases, evidencH was
also presented to indicate that there were upwards of
380 parcels of land which on January 1, 1961, were in
the, pos~session of private individuals under a contract of
sale from the State. The trial court found that approximately 200 of these properties were in the hands of
private individuals using the property in connection
wi,th .a business for a profi,t, but were not taxed under
Secti~on 59-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 277.) To the extent that
users of these properties were taxed they were taxed
under Section 59-2-2, U.G..A., on their equities only.
(Ex. 1.)
In relation to lands sold by the State, the State Tax
Commission is required to certify to the l'ocal assessors
10
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the equity value of property sold by the State so that
the tax may be impoi5Pd pursuant to Section 59-2-2,
r.C .. \. (~P<'iions 59-5-50 and 59-5-51 of U.C.A.) Mr.
~lax I I. K('tT, Director of Property Tax for the Utah
~tab· Tax ( iommis:-;ion, was asked on cross-examination
W'hPthPr any consideration was given to a change in this
prad i<'P after the passa;ge of Section 59-13-73, U.C.A.
He replied, "So far as I know the only thing ·that has
ha.ppem•d sin<'<' the imposition of this law in regard to
state lnnd equities has been the same as before. We have
hePn certifying them to the County Assessors in accordmwe with the law that n~quires us to." (R. 107.) He
was furtlwr examined relative to the Commission's activities with relation to Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., and
h'~tit'it>d as follows (R. 107-108):

Q Have any new instructions been issued
by t lw State Tax Commission~
A "\Vi t h regard to this ~
Q Yes.
A

Not to my knowledge.

Q Does the State ·Tax Commission have the
authority to direct County As'sessors to assess
property which they have ovedooked when it
comes to the attention of the State Tax Commission that the properties have been omitted from
the tax rolls?
A It is my understanding that the Tax Commission has the authority, after the Board of
Equalization has met, to review the work of the
County Assessors and to assess in its own name
this property.
Q Any property that was omitted~
A Yes.
11
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Q Has the State Tax Commission, in the
exercise of that authority, ever made any assessments under section 59-13-73 for the year 1961?
A Not to my knowledge.
The only effort made by the State Tax Commission

to advise county assessors as to the enforcement of
Section 59-13-73 oecurred at the annual assessor's school
conducted on December 10 and 11, 1959. 'The major part
of the discussion that occurred at the assessor's school
involved a legal analysis of the recent Michigan cases
and an opinion as to the constitutionality of taxing us~ers
of Federal Government property. The only indication
that property other than that belonging to the United
States was also included within the ambit of the tax
occurs in one sentence where it is stated, "Of course, this
does not apply only to Government owned property but
also 1nay apply to any exempt property." (Ex. 7, p. 24.)
No other directive relative to the application of Section
59-13-73, U.C.A., was ever prepared by the State Tax
Commission. (R. 132.)
The trial court on the basis of this evidence found
that there were more than 200 parcels of property
used by individuals subject to the provisions of Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., but that only five parcels not
belonging to the Federal Government were taxed under
that section. (R. 247-248.) The conclusions of the court
are ably summarized in its oral opinion (R. 200-201):
Well, regardless of whether it's the 14th
Amendment or the right of the government to
carry on its primary functions, there's no question about it, gentlemen. Under the law as announced in W~ashington the state must uniformlY

12
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and wit'l1011t di~erimination enforce it~ laws. The
roUI"t tan 't hring ibelf to the point of making a
findng of fact in this case that because the tax
people ot' {Ttah have only assessed the Southern
P•u·ifi<· Railroad on an easement and the ~Texas
Company on thrPP or four oil leases, and Thiokol,
that this practice 'has been so acquiesced in by the
tax pPople as to constitute discrimination in the
leg-al spnsP. Tlwse state land contracts, gentlenwn, under tlw stipulation of the parties there
are about 200 or some such number of these contrads that the court has examined, which if the
court recalls correct! Y there's about that number
wltt·n· the purchaser ·of these state lands in 1961
pla<'Pd those lands to commercial use. rrhe court
finds from the stipulation that this was a commen•ial use, but nothing was done collectively by
thosp tax people. I'll just treat them collective}~~
as tax people, because the Tax Commis·sion has
snpPrvisory duties under the Constitution and
the assessor has, I guess, primary responsibility.
Rut collectively in all the counties of the state
there apparently has been a studied indifference
over these state land contracts, and notwithstandin~ the fact that the Land Board is across the
hall or another floor, somehow or other, though
these lands are being used for grazing of animals
and used in commercial practice, in not one instance, if the court recalls the record correctly,
has .any a~~essment been made under this privilege tax.
Xow the court is just simply impelled into
the conclusion that so long as the state is going
to continue to practice such discrimination, the
least this court can do is to raise its voice in prote~t and de-cide in favor of the plaintiff and find
that the tax ha~ been discriminatorily applied and
with reluctance direct that the money be returned
with the interest provided by statute. * * *

13
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ARGU~IEXT

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IN'TRODUCED AT TRIAL
C L EARLY SUPPOR.TS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING ·THAT THE TAXING
OFFICIALS OF BOX ELDER COUNTY AND
THE STA:TE OF UTAH DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND
THOSE WITH WHOM IT DEAL1T IN THEIR
ADMINISTRA'TION OF THE U'TAH PRIVILEGE T·AX, SECTION 59-13-73, U.C.A.
The basic legal principles upon which the decision of
this ease rests had their genesis in one of ~the early land'mark cases in our constitutional history. In 1819 Chief
Justice Marshall writing for the Court in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 437, held that under our system of dual sovereignty "the states have no power, by
taxation or otherwise to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws enacted by congreS's to carry into execution the
powers ve·sted in the general government". Since its inception this principle has had two aspects. First, the
states may not levy a tax the incidence of which falls
upon the Federal Government or its instrumentalities.
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944);
United States v. City of Detro~it, 355 U.S. 466 (1958);
City of Detroit v. Mur~ay Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
The second aspeet of this decision was most recently
restated in PhiZZ.ips Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S.
376, 387, which held that, "it still remains true, as it has
from the tim·e of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
that a state tax may not discriminate against the Governn1ent or those with whom it deals."
14
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rrhe trial judge based hiR resolution Of the present
,·nrttrover~v on the ~Peond aspect of this principle. He
ntlPd tlUtt although SPetion 59-13-73, F.C.A., Appendix,
i11lrn, wn~ not n tax on the United States, and that on its
ra''" the ~P<'tion did not discriminate against the United
~tatt-:-;, nev1·rtheless the officials of both Box Elder
t 'ount ~· and the State of Utah have applied the tax with
~m·h "~tudied indifference" (R. 200) that discrimination
ngnin~t the Federal Government and those with whom it
dt>alt wn~ the inescapable result. An examination 'Of the
PvidPtwe leaves room for no other conclusion.

A. The evidence of discrimination by the taxing
officials of Box Elder County.
The defendant in this suit is Le Grande Peterson,
treasurer of Box Elder County, the taxes were asse·ssed
hy the official~ of Box Elder County on property poss~~~~d and used by Thiokol within the County. In these
eircmnstances it is the contention of Thiokol and the
Fnitro ~tat0s that, although the tax is imposed by state
law, they are entitled to a refund on showing that the
official~ of the County wielded their power in such a
way as to discriminate against the United States ·and
tho~" with whom it dealt. It is not essential to show, as
wa~ in fact the case, that this discrimination existed
throughout the State.
~~ction

59-13-73, r.C.A., by its terms purports to
ta.x all individuals using exempt property in business f'or
a profit of -10 per cent of the fair market value of that
property. Arc>epting for purposes of argument the trial
judge'~ interpretation of the relationship betweeen Sec-
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tion 39-:2-2, U.C.A., Appendix, illj'ra, .and S.ection 59-13-73,
U.C.A., it was the duty of the county officials to apply
Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., equally to all persons using
either federal or state property in business for a profit. 4
In fact, although the evidence reveals that there were
m.any parcels of property owned by the State and used
by private persons in business for a profit within the
jurisdiction of Box Elder County, not a single user of
such property who was subject to the tax was assessed.
As to the properties identified in evidence as "Brigham
City properties" the record discloses that they were
not taxed under any provision of the Utah l.aw. (R. 247;
Ex. 1.) l\1or·eover, there were 34 parcels of property purchased by private individuals under a contract of sale
frmn the state title to which re1nained in the State. (Ex.
8.) To the extent th.at these individuals were taxed at all,
the tax was levied solely on their equity in the property;
yet the trial court found that at least 27 of these properties were used in a business for a profit, and in all other
respects were subject to the provisions of Section 59-1373, U.C.A. (R. 247-248.)
Only one assessment was made pursuant to Section
59-13-73, U.C.A., by the county officials for 1961; the
assessment against Thiokol. (R. 246.) It is therefore
not surprising that the trial judge failed to credit the
appellant's factual contention that the County's f-ailure to
assess state users was due to 1nere oversight. The only
testimony to this effect cited by appellant (Br 9) is
4.

Respondents do not accept the trial court's conclusion

(R. 250) that Section 59-13-73 U.C.A., impliedly repealed the

inconsistent provisions of Section 59-2-2, U .C.A. See part II,

infra.

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with n·I'Prt'll('(l to a :-;ing-1<' pun·t-l of property, the :-;o-ealled
"(;rav•·l Pit ~itl'." ~\:-;to tltllt. pan~el the county a:-;se:-::-:or
had sought advi<'P from the Ctah State Ta.x Cmmuission
a~ to it:-: taxahilit~· and had been infonned hr the Commi:-::-:ion that tlH' 11:-i<' r w.a:-; taxable under Section 59-13-I:L
( l·:x. !I.) :\ l'YPrt hPIP:-;:-;. dPs pite thi:-; correspondence the
,L:.Ta\·t·l pit ~itt· was not taxl•tl in 19()1 and it is sole]y in
r"lation to thi:-; failun' to a:-;se:-;:-; that Fred L. Peterson.
tlw County AssPssor. tt·stified that there was an over~ight. (H. I 7!l.) The ~:~Yidence adduced at trial thus clearh·. shows that t hP defendant and other countY
. officials
di:o:('riminatPd ag·ain:-;t '1_1hiokol and the United States in
tlu•ir complete failun· to a:-:sps·s any taxpayer other than
Thiokol for the tax due under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A.
In thiR situation the trial judge's finding of discrimination is ntmssailable.

B. The evidence of discrimination by taxing
officials throughout the state.
In its hrief in this Court appellant seems to proceed
upon tla~ assumption that the Fnited States is required
to show tlmt this disc-riminatory application of the act
prt•Yailed throughout the State (pp. -!6-58.) Since the
dt>fendant in this easp is the treasurer of Box Elder
Count~-. a ~tate-widP showing of di~criinination seen1s
unnPePs:-:a ry. HowPYPr, a~ the trial judge's conclusions
indiNt.te, the di~crimination against the l~nited States wa~
not (•onfined to Box Elder County but occurred throughout tlw ~tate. The record indicates that across the
State a~ a wholl' then· were 380 vendees of land under
enntraet of sale from the ~tate and of these approximatPly :200 wer~:~ subject to ta..x lmder Section 59-13-73,
17
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U.C.A. IIowever, not one of these individuals found
subject to the tax was assessed under Section 59-13-73,
U.C.A. (R. 247-248.) 5 'To the extent that any of the 380
vendees were taxed at all it was upon their equity only
under Bection 59-2-2, F.C.A. In addition, a series of
special use leases was introduced into evidence. Five of
these, all apparently utilities subject to the assessment
jurisdiction of the Utah State Tax Commission rather
than the county assessors, were taxed in accordance, with
Seetion 5·9-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 138.) These five use leases
constitute the only evidence that any users of state prop'"
erty were assessed under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., in
1961.
The United States made careful inquiry at the trial
to ascertain what steps had been taken by the Utah State
Tax Commission to inform the loeal assessors under the
Commission's supervision of the privilege t:ax and advise
the·m as to its implementation. The state witnesses indicated that the only action taken in this respect was
at the 1959 Assessors School at which the, new tax was
discussed. (R. 105.) The entire discussion at that time
centered on the constitutionality and revenue potential of
applying the tax wgainst persons using United States
property. Only one sentence of that discussion intimated
5. Appellant has suggested for the first time in its brief
in this Court that the assessor of Kane County taxed some property within that county in accordance with Section 59-13-73,
U.C.A. (Br. 46.) This i,s contrary to the stipulation of facts
(Ex. 1), and the court's findings ( R. 24 7-248), and concerns
a fact as to which respondents have no knowledge and have never
had the opportunity to challenge, by cross-examination or otherwise. It is certainly not a proper subject of judicial notice and
respondents strenuously object to any consideration of the
matter in this suit.
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that thP appiicability of thP tax Pxknded beyond users
ot' t't•tlPra.l property and included n~Pr~ of all fonns of
(1'\l'lllpt propPI1y. (l~~X. 7, p. ~-t)
Other than the procPedings at the above-mentioned
:·whool, no other ~ tPp~ appear to have been taken by the
Utah ~tatP Tax Comn1ission. The Commission has continm•d to certify equity values of vendees of state land
eontract:-; and no directives appear to have been issued
indieating to the recipients of these equity lists that they
might be useful in discovering property subject to the
privilege tax. (R.. 107, Ex. 8.) It thus appears that there
i~ ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding
that. the di~criminator~· aetions of state taxing officials
ag-n.inst Thiokol and the United States occurred on a
~tate-wide basis.

It. i:-; tn1e that ~fax H. Kerr, Director of Property
Tax for tlw Utah State T·ax Commission, testified that
it wa~ the Commission's policy to tax all exempt property alikC', and that the only reason that property suhjeet to the tax would escape assessment would be attributable to the lactk of discovery. (R. 98-101.) However,
~[r. Kerr also testified that the Commission has authority to a~~P:'s any property not assessed by the county
nsst-:'~nr~. but admitted this authority had never been
(IX(\rri~Pd under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 108.) Section ;)~l-5--!6, r.C.A., chronicles the many and varied
ftmctions of the l ~ tah State Tax Commission and clearly
indirates the large measure of responsibility vested in
that body to control, adYise and supplement the work
of the ro1mty assessors. For example, Mr. Kerr testified
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that the Couunission continually 1nakes investigations
to detennine the existence of property that has Pscaped
taxation, although he could not recall a singl(l instance
where property was uncovered and added to the tax
rolls under :--icetion 59-13-73, P.C.A., (R. 111.) In these
circumstances the trial judge seems clearly correct in
failing to find as a fact that the state-wide f'ailure to
assess could be attributable to oversight. Under (ltah
law the failure to find a fact as urged by one of the parties is within the peroga:tive of the fact finder and the
trial judge's factual deter1ninations will not be overruled. De Vas v. X oble, 13 U.2d 133. The appellant has
failed to show any error in the trial court's refusal to
accept "oversight" as an explanation.

C. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the trial court's finding.
In addition to suggestion that the trial court erred
in failing to find that the discriminatory application of
the tax was due to oversight, appellant has suggested
that there is insufficient evidenc;e of discrimination itself.
(Br. -!7.) This ch'allenge by appellant see1ns to be predicated on two different grounds. First, it is argued (Br.
48) that even though Section 59-13-73 U.C ..A. purports
to apply to all property, both real and personal, Thiokol
1nay only rely on evidence of a discriminatory treatment
of per~onal property. Second, it is argued (Br. 52-55)
that in order to prove unconstitutional discrimination,
Thiokol and the United States 1nust prove a specific
intent to discriminate and the evidence, of this intent
was insufficient.
20
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.\ ppl·llant'=-- fi 1·=--t ut·gmnent dearly ig·1wn'=-' the la.nof tlu~ :-;tatntP itself. It is predicated on the propo:o:ition that tl11• HtntP Legislature might havP pa~~(·d a dift't•rt~nt ~tatute, one t•ovPring personal property only,
n.nd thnt =--twh n :-;ta.tute if it had been Pnacted 1night have
h··•·n applit~d in a non-di~eriminatory 1nanner. However,
this nr~"ltment rannot detract fro1n the fact that the
~t1ltute as }Hl~=-'Pd applied equally to persons using real
o1· pPr~onnl propert~r in a business for profit. The
~tntutP hy it~ terms covered many people subject to the
tax in addition to rfhiokol, yet 'U.S applied by the county
only rrhiokol was a~~Pssed and as applied on a. state-wide
ha~i~. only a handful of utilities were assessed. (R. 246~.f!).) The overwhelming 1najority of people subject to
:-\pl'tion ;l!)-13-7:3 F.C.A. P:o:eaped that section's 1nandate
('Olllp}etp}y.

~·Ul~P

The only ea:-:p eited b~· appellant (Br. 48) in support
of it=-- argument i~ f.'sso Sta.ndard Oilv. E·tJ.aus, 345 U.S .
.f!)+: however, an exruuination of that case reveals that
it i~ coneerned with a totally different situation. In
that (·a=--e E~~o was storing gasoline owned by tl1e United
~tate~ in tanks owned or leased by Esso and was held
sub,iect to the Tennessee tax on the total gallonage so
~tored. An earlier rrennessee case had exempted a state
ag'{'nry from this tax on the basis that the storage tanks
were lt~a:'Pd hy the state agency. The Supren1e Court
h(\ld that a di:'tinction in treatment based on whether
theo :'torage tanks were in the possession of a private
party or the Government was a reasonable c.lassification
and refused to as~ume that the state would have denied
nn exPmption to the rnited States if the Vnited States
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had leased the storage tan:ks rather than Esso. Thus in
Ess.a the United States was posing the hypothetical possibility that rrennessee would not have followed its earlier
precedent even if the United States had leased the storage tanks. This case is certainly not an authority which
permits appellants to argue that a differently worded
statute in this case might have been applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. If an;nthing, Es,so Standa.rd Oil
v. Evans, supra, supports the respondent's position that
we .are concerned with the actual statute and its aciual
application. In this case it is clear that the statute as
actually drawn subj~ected a large number of persons
to its tax, but as .actually applied only the users of federal
property were assessed in Box Elder County, and when
viewed on a ·state-wide basis only a handful of utilities
were inc1uded within the section's ambit. (R. 246-249.)
Appellant's second challenge (Br. 52-55) to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial judge's finding of discriminatory intent is equally without merit.
In the first inst~ance appellant has proceeded on the
assumption that the legal s~tandard upon which the trial
judge must weigh the evidence is the same standard
used in the "equal-protection claus·e" eases. On the basis
of that assumption appellant then argues that the evidence was insufficient. Both the assumption upon which
the appellant has proceeded .and the conclusion it reached
on the basis of this assumption are incorrect.
Appellant's claim that the sufficiency of the evidence
must be rneasured against the sarne legal standard as the
Suprerne Court of the United States has used in the
equal-protection clause cases is incorrect as a matter
22
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111' law. .\.s the ~nprPmP Court of the United States

,h•t·lan·<l most recentlv in Phi!l ips Co. r. Dumas School
/Jist., :~li 1 F.~. 37(), :~S;) "It is true that perfection is by
11 11 mPanH requirP<l under the equal protection test of
pt'nnissible elassification. But we have made it clear,
in the t>q ua l protection <'a~e~, that our decisions in that
fip\,l are not ne<·P~~arily controlling where problems
of intergovPrntnental tax immunity are involved."

·To the ~anw effect wa~ l\1:r. Justice Jackson's statement in Uuif<'d States L Allegheny County, 322 U.S.174,
191:

The questions in this case do not arise under
the Fourteenth Amendment. They depend on pro-visions adopt·ed and principles settled long before
the Fourteenth Amendment and which exist independently of it.
Th.iokor s clain1 is predicated on supremacy clause
principles announced some fifty years befove the FourtPenth .\1nendment was even adopted. The right asserted
hy Thiokol and the Fnited States in this case is founded
exeln~ively upon the Federal Government's right to operate without discriinination directed against it or those
with whom it deals. \\ifien evidence is adduced at trial
that a ta.x ha~ been applied in such a way as to affect the
rnited States differently than those equally affected
under the statutory terms, such application cannot be
sustained. ~-\s long as such unequal treatment has any
praetical impart on the United States or those 'vith whom
it deals, the application of that law is unconstitutional.
lou·a.-Des .1/oines Bank r. Bennett, 28-! lT.S. 239.
The /ou·a-Des . .llaines Bank case, supra, presents
an exceHPnt example of the distinction between the equal
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protection clause te:::;t of discrhnination mul the t<·:.;t applied when the in1n1unity of the l~nited State~ is involved.
That ca~e involved the consolidated claim of both a
national and a ~tate bank, that they were di~eriminated
against by being taxed at a higher rate on their ~tcwk
than sirnilar rnonied corporations. The ~tate ('ourt a:-;.
surned the discrimination ,as charged, but held that it wa:-;
attributable to the illegal action of the eounty auditor and
that no cause of action existed. The Supreme Court of
the rnited States reversed; however, it treated the
rights of the national bank differently from the rights
of the state bank. A:-; to the national bank, the Court
held that it wa~ an in~trumentality of the Federal (;overnrnent, taxable onl:· by the consent of t!te F·ederal Uovernment, and stated "The limits of tlli:-: permission (to
tax) w·ere tran::-~gre~::-~ed when the tre,asurer Px.aeted
fron1 this petitioner taxes at rate:-: greater than thmw
applied in exacting pay1nent from the competing domestie
corporations." (P. 244.) There was no :-;ugge:-tion that an~·
intent~ional or systernatic discri1nination \\·a~ required.
It was only when Justice Brandeis reached the part of
the opinion (p. :2-!3) labeled "Second," which coneernPd
the elain1 of the state bank under the equal protection
clause, that the clairn of intentional and :-:·:-:t(•uwti<' cli:-;.
crimination he('anw important. Thn:-; it is clear that appellant':-: challenge to thP sufficiency of the evidence in
the in:-;tant case, based a:-; it i~ on the equal protection
:-;1anclard, is predicated on a incorrect articulation of the
tP:-;t against which the evidence adduced at trial i:-; to
ht> judged. The evidenee clearly reYeab that. rPgarcll!'~~
of what rnay have been the intent of the legislature in
pa8:-:ing ~Petion 59-13-73, F.C.~-\ .. it has been aclministerf'd
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with :-:twh an utwvt-n hand that a \'t-ry rPa.l di~('riminatory
impn(•t a.u:ain~t the lTnited NtatP~ has re~ulted. The collt·d ion or the tax in thf'~(' <·i rcuinstances was tlwrefore
in violation of the Con~titution of the United States and
the trial judge wa~ eorred in granting judgnwnt to Thiokolnnd tlw [nitPd Ntate~ in the refund action.
llowPVPr, even if we assume, for purposes of argunwnt. that the proper test of discri1nination in this case
i:-: tlw ~ame a~ that applied in the equal protection clause
~·a:-;"~. tht- United States has met its burden of proof.
l t :-:t•Pm:-; dear frOin the trial judge's oral opinion, finding-~ and conclusions of law (R. 195-202, :2-t-5-251), there
was ~uh~tantial evid_ence to meet the equal protection
:-:tnndard. l 1nder Ftah law the burden of course res.ts
upon the appellant to show wherein such findings are
nnsupportPd h~· the evidence. In L01re v. Rosenlof, 12 U.
~\1190, lD:!, it wa~ stated:
This court has stated on numerous oceasions
that findings of fact made by the trial court will
not be disturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, the findings of
the lower court 1nust be affirmed unless there
wa~ no reasonable basis in the evidence on which
the court could fairly and rationally have thought
the requisite proof was met.
Appellant's argument (Br. 5:2) in this respect 1nerely
:-;ug·g-,•:.-t~ that the failure to assess the gre81t bulk of property attributable to Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was due
either to a mistake as to the facts or a mistake as to
the law. 4-\~ we noted earlier, the trial judge did not
aeeept the appellant's factual theory that this failure was
attributable to a mere oversight. This was the eourt's
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prerogative as fa0t finder. De ras v. Noble, Sllpra. In
addition appellant seems to suggest that the evidence
is insufficient because no one testified that they intended
to discriminate against the United States. (Br. 55-56.)
This latter argument seems predicated on the ground
that in order to have discrimination in the terms of the
equal protection test the taxing officials mus,t have some
specific intent to diseriminate- in other words, an evil
motive. This is not the law. It is true that the equal
protection test requires an intentional or systematic
discrimination between persons similarly situated. But
the intention required is merely a general intent. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board,
284 U.S. 23; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620.
The complete f·ailure of the cnunty officials to assess an~'
persons subject to the tax and their similar failure to
even trouble to make an investigation to determine the
existence of such persons provides overwhelming support for the trial court's characterization of their actions as involving a "studied indifference" (R. 200); the
apparent parallel lack of action that occurred throughout the state is equally conclusive in this regard.
It is quite clear that both the county officials and
the State Tax Commission knew, ·or should have known,
that there '''ere a great number of state-owned properties
that were used by persons subject to the privilege tax.
The very fact tlra t there were 380 properties in the hands
of private individuals under contract of sale from the
State should have made this clear. (Ex. 8.) Certainly appellants could not have believed that not one of these
26
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propertiP:-i w.u:-; U:-it>d in business for a profit, yet no effort
was made to dete11nine which of these properties were
:-iUbjt-et to thP tax. If the appellants purposely failed to
a:-il'·('rtnin whieh properties were subject to the tax beenll:-iP tlwy did not believe Section 59-13-73, U.C.A.,
applied to state-owned lands, the tax w.as unconstitutionnlly Pxaded. In ~ueh a case, the "intent" require1nent of
thP eQual protPdion test is satisfied by showing that the
defendant~ intended not to tax state property; the fact
that tltPy did not have a c·onscious purpose to discriminah', or that their failure was based on a mistake of law,
i~ i rrdev.ant. On the other hand, if they bel~ieve Section
;l~l-13-73, F.C.A., was applicable to those among the 380
who used the property in business for a profit, and were
llll'l'Ply indifferent to the discrimination which must
follow their failure to investigate or assess such propt•rty, the intention test is equally satisfied. In such a
ca~e the "intent" element is supplied by the studied
indifference of the taxing officials in the face of a result that they knew, or should have known, was certain
to follow.
Accordingly, although the United States does not
eoncede that the equal protection test of discrimination
i~ applicable to this case, even when the evidence is
measured against that standard, it is clear that there
wa~ ample eYidence to support the trial court's finding
that (R. ~50):
The taxes paid under protest were discriminatorily assessed and levied in violation of the
Constitution of the United States and the S.tate
of l~tah, and were therefore illegal and void.
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D. The trial court was correct in ordering a
refund of the full amount of the tax which
was illegally collected.
In its brief (Br. 56) the appellant has contend(:'d
in the .alternative that if the evidence is sufficient to sustain ·the trial judge'•s findings, the relief accorded was
nevertheless improper. Appellant contends that the trial
court should have created its own tax by determining "the
percentage value that the assessn1ent to Thi'Okol bore to
the average percentage assess1nent to the non-assessed
property and granted a reduction, if any, in the excess
mnount and judgment only for that amount." (Br. GS.)
The suggestion of appellants bears a striking resemb~ance ·to the contention rejected by the Supreme
Court in .Jloses Lake 1-1 antes v. Gr{]jnt County, 365 U.S.
7-1-±. In that case Grant County attempted to tax the
full value of buildings and improvmnents on privatelyowned 'V"herry Act leaseholds of housing developments
on a federally-owned Air Force base, although it taxed
other leaseholds, including privately-owned leaseholds
of tax-exe1npt state lands, at a lower valuation. The Court
of Appeals had directed that the tax be reduced to what it
would have been if the tax had been levied on a nonWherry Aet leashold basis. In reversing tllis direction,
the Sup:r:en1e Court silnply stated "\Vhen, as here, the tax
is invalid, it '1nay not be exacted.' Phillips Co. r. Dumas
Scho·ol District, 361 U.S., at 387." (365 r.S. 7-14, 752).
In this 0ase the taxing officials of Box Elder County
enforced Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., against Thiokol for its
mw of rnited States property but failed to enforce that
tax against any other taxpayers subject to the tax.
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..\ppt-llant ~ugg-('~t:-; that if the Court finds this action
un 1 ·on~t itutional t Itt> Court may then proceed to fashion
l\ difft-rt>nt tax wllieh will lw constitutional. Appellant
:'PPIII~ to ignon' thP fact that tht>n• is no legislative authorization for :-;ueh behavior and that its suggestion
would in t>t't't><·t rP<luire this Court to draft a totally new
:-;tntntP and then decree its application. 6
.\ ppeHant argm-'s that it is essential for this Court
tn fashion such a remedy because otherwise Thio!kol
would be put "in a better position than others and all he
is entitled to is to be placed in a generally equal position."
(Hr. ;l7.) T·his argument is simply not in accord with
thP fads. The legislature in 1959 passed a privilege tax.
The taxing officials failed to .apply 1this tax to anyone
htt t Thiokol. Thiokol j :-; therefore entitled to the same
tr~ntment that everyone else received: not to he taxed
und~r ~Petion 59-13-73 U.C.A .
.\ ppellant appears to have once again been misled
hy the equal protection cases. In those ca;ses the situation
:-;om~tinws ari8es that the valuation of the complaining

partip:-;' property is greatly in excess of the valuation
placed on similar property of others. In such a situa6. In addition, the formula that appellant would have this
Court apply has a doubtful constitutional basis and the United
States does not concede that it would be valid. It appears to aggregate all the properties subject to the tax and then apply an
average rate of tax to Thiokol. However, some of these properties were not taxed at all. Some were taxed on the equity interest
only and the amount of tax would thus vary from property to
property according to the particular contracts and the rate of
payment. Any rate derived from such a scheme appears entirely
too whimsical, arbitrary and incapable of ascertainment to serve
.1s a basis for taxing users of property owned by the United
States.
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tion the obvious remedy is to reduce the plaintiff's valuation to those and of all others silnilarly situated. The
situation here is quite different. We, a:ve not confronted
with a discriminatory exercise of power under a statute
with regard to the amount of the assessment; rather, we
are confronted with a failure to apply the statute at
all. Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is not to apply
Section 59-13-i73, U.C.A., :to Thiokol.

II
THE 'TAX IMPOSED ON USERS OF STATE
PROPERTY BY SECTION 59-2-2, U.C.A.,
WHEN COMPARED WITH THE TAX IMPOSED ON USE·RS OF FEDERAL PROPERTY BY SECTION 59-13-73, U. C .A.,
WORKS AN UNCONBTITUTTONAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNITED
BTATES.
Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., is one of the exemption provisions contained in the Utah tax code. In effect this
section limits the tax liability of contract purchasers and
lessees of state land to the value of their equitie·s in the
land and any improvements. Sections 59-5-50, and 59-551, U.C.A., seem specifically designed to facilitate the
administration of the tax in relation to state-owned properties b~, providing thaJt the State Land Board is to submit a list of properties sold by the State to the State Tax
Oom1nis,sion, which is in turned required to inform the
local asses,sors of any such properties. Nothing in Section 59-2-2, P.C.A., provides for any difference in tax
treatment when the 'Contract purchasers or lessees use the
state property in business for a profit.
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On the other hand, ~Petion 59-13-73, t:".C ..A., purpot·ts to tnx persons using tax-exempt property in busin•·~~ for a profit on thP full value of such property. It
is appnn·nt that unless Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., has
~uperl:'ede(l or repealed the limitation on the tax imposed
hy SPd ion :-l!l-:2-~, U.C.A., to the e~tent that purchas·ed
:->tatt- propPtty is used in business for a profit, Seetion
.-l~l-13-7:~, lT.C.A., is unconstitutional. Phillips Co. v. Dumas Sd~aol IJist ., 361 U.S. 376; JJI oses Lake Homes v.
Urant rolln(lt, 365 lT.S. 74-t This much the appellants
have conceded. In their brief it is stated (p. 39) :
Indeed, were any different construction given
statute a difference in tax as·seS'sment valuation would exist he-tween lessees and beneficial
possessors of federal lands and those of state
lands. This would obviously render the Privilege
Tax discriminatory and hence unconstitutional.

~the

ln order to avoid the unconstitutional discrimination
inherent in the two sections, the trial court held that Section j~l-13-7:~. U.C.A., impliedly repealed Section 59-2-2,
l".C ..A., to the extent that the latter section purports to
limit the tax on persons using state property in busine:-;:-; for a profit. (R. 250.) In support of this ruling
appellants rely on the princple7 that (Br. 41)if there are two possible constructions of a statute,
one of which will render •the statute constitutional
and the other unconstitutional or render the con-'
~titutionality doubtful, the interpretation will be
adopted which will save the statute.

---7.

Appellants also suggest (Br. 45) that Section 59-13-77

~.C.A .• express]y repeals any inconsistent portion of Sectio~
<l9-2-2, U.C.A.; however, nothing in the language of that section
suggests any form of repeal was intended.
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I-Iowever, appellants also recognize (Br. 43) that an application of the above canon of construction to the faet:-;
of this case creates a conflict ·with the equally persuasive
principle that the law does not favor repeal h~· impliration. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), Hr<'tion 2014.
In this respect this Court has stated in Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 U. 186, 196:
It is elementary that statutes may be repealed
by implication, and where the provisions of a later
statute are clearly and manifestly repugnant to
the provisions of existing statutes the latter are
deemed repealed to the extent of such repugnancy.
Such repeals, however, are not favored, and if two
apparently conflicting acts can be reasonrubly construed so as to reconcile and give an effect to each,
such construction should be adopted.
That the statutes in question can be construed \rithout repugnancy is amply illustrated by the actions of
the taxing officials in this case. These officials, whose
administrative actions in construing the statutes are
entitled to great weight (E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 109 U. 563, 578), simply applied Section
59-13-73, U.C.A., to users of federal properties and
Se·ction 59-2-2, U.C.A., to users of state property. The
difficulty is not that the legislature has enacted two
statutes that are 1~epugnant in their ·operation, rather,
the proble1n sten1s from the f.aet that the two statutes,
when construed in harmony with one another, violate
the United States Constitution. Phillips Co. t:. Dumas
School D·ist., supra; 1lloses Lake Homes v. Grant County,
supra.
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111

PROPERLY COXSTRUI~~D, SECTION 59-13r.C.A., IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIOKOL'S USE OF THE GOVERN~IENT'S
PROPJ1~H.'£Y IX PERFOR.JIAN,CE OF THE
H.ESEARCII AND DEYELOP~IENT CONTRACT BE'T\VEEN THEM; AND, IF CONSTRU}JD TO APPLY TO SUCH USE, SEC'PION flD-13-73 U.C.A., VIOLA:TES THE CON~TITUTIONAL
IMJ\IUNITY OF T H E
r~l'rED STATES FROM STATE TAXATIO~ BECAUSE LAID UPON A USE SOLELY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE UNITED
~~

~TATES.

rnder the terms of the research and development
l'Ontra('lt hd\n'<'n Thiokol and the United States (Ex. 6)
Thiokol's compensation \\·as fixed at the outset of the
l'ontraet. Unlt-ss there was a change in the work to be
performed, Thiokol's fee would re1nain unchanged regardlt·~s of the actual cos'ts that are incurred (R. 77)
and this predetermined compensation could not be inl'reased hy the extent or 1nanner in which Thiokol used
the Government property in its possession (R. 74). Since
Thiokol l'ould not derive any pecuniary benefit from
it~ n~P of thjs property, it does not constitute the "posses~ion or other beneficial use" which is taxed by Section
.)~l-13-73, r.C.A. :Moreover, if it be deemed to be the use
contemplated by the statute, the tax is here actually
hPing levied on the Government's beneficial use of its
own property in the conduct of Government business.
Thiokol is not selling the first stage of a missile to
the Fnited States. It is selling only its research and
development services in connection with the production of
33
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a missile and this missile is owned by the United States
in every phase of its production. Thiokol's fee for iti'
research and development services is finnly fixed and
it cannot be taxed on the Governn1ent-ovmed propPrty
used in performing the services since it has no taxable
interest in such property. That any such tax is a ta.x
on the United States is well illustrated by an example
given in the District Court's decision in United States v.
Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 23 (E.D.S.C.), affirmed per
cuf'liam, 364 U.S. 281:
The custodian of a f·ederal post office building is paid for the performance of his duties, but
his use of the materials he requires in the performance of his housekeeping duties is so completely that of the United States that no one
would think of taxing him upon the value of the
materials.
This result prainly does not turn on a distinction between
individual and corporate employment. A local express
company hired at a monthly fee to manage and operate
a post office on behalf of the United States could not
be taxed on the use of the post office if all profit from the
post office operations would belong to the United States.
In this case the tax is one upon the United States (although it purports to be upon a Government contractor
and is collected from the contractor) because it is a tax
on the beneficial use of the prop·e:rly; and the United
States reaps all ~the benefits fr01n the use of the property it owns.
The unconstitutionality of the tax imposed by Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., as applied to this case is highlighted b~- a comparison of the pres·ent case with the
34
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~Lichigan "u:o~P" tax ('.ase~ decided in 1957. United States
,.. City of Ddroit, 355 U.S. 466; United St.ates v. Town.."'hip of .l/u . . -kctJon, ~55 l:.s. 484. (A companion case, City
of J)t'f roil r. ~.l/ wrray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, did not involve
n "u:o~p" tax.) In the ~lichigan cases, the Supreme Court
h•·hl Umt a :-~taU• may impose upon an independent contnwtoi' a use ta..x measured by a value of tax-exempt property ust•d in the business of manufacturing products lwter
to be sold in one case to third parties and in the other
to thP United States. In each case, a private party used
Uovl'I1lment property to manufactur·e goods which it
then :-;old for its own profit. Its profit from the sale of
it:-; product was the result of application not only of its
own work but also of the property it used. In short, the
contrador enjoyed the benefits of the use of Governm·entowned property. Therefore, the private contractor cd'Uld
be taxPd upon the privilege of using the capital assets
owned by the United States. Here, in contrast, the fee
n•et>in"'d hy Thiokol is in no part .attributable to the Government-owned property used in the performance of its
I'P:->t'a.rch and development contract. The payments are
simply and entirely for Thiokol's services; it cannot
profit by any increase or decrese in production because
nf the efficiency or inefficiency of the Government0\\'lled equipment; it uses this equipment because it is
needed in the research .and de:velopment and not because
it profits from the product tllis property helps to produce. ~\ny benefits from the use of the Governmentowned property belong to the United S.tates and any tax
on the benefits of using this Government property is a
ta.x upon the rnited States, which alone enjoys the benefits of its use.
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In the ~lichigan cases, the Supreme Court recognized
the distinction we are now urging, and reserved for a
future case the question here presented. In United States
v. Township of 111.uskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486-487, the Supreme Oourt emphasized that Continental, which used
Government property in the performance of supply contracts with the Government, "was free within broad
limits to use the property as it thought advantageous and
convenient in perforn1ing its contracts and maximizing
its profits from the·m." The Supreme Court noted that
Continental was "acting as a private enterprise selling
goods to the United 8ta;te·s. In a certain loose way it
might be c.alled an 'instrumentality' of the Fnited
States, but no more so than any other private parties
supplying goods for its own gain to the Government." It
stated (355 U.S., P. 486) : "The case might well be different if the Government had reserved such control over
the activities and financial gain of Continental that it
could properly be called a 'servant' of the United States
in agency terms." In thus reserving the question, however, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended
to make immunity depend upon whether the private party
was an "independent contractor" rather than a servant,
as that distinction has dev:eloped in the law concerning a
master's liability for the torts of a servant. Rather, we
suggest that the Supreme Court used the phrase " 'servant' of the United States" as a shorthand phrase to describe the private party which was paid to perform services for the Government as distinguished from one who
was "free * * * to use the property as it thought advantageous and convenient in performing its contracts and
maximizing its profits from them."
36
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Thl' qtw~tion left open .in the )lichigan cases and here
pn·;o;t·nted-whether a state may tax a private party's use
of (i ovPrnmen t property in the course of rendering servii'P:-1 for the l'nited States where the private party never
owm•<l or enjoyt•d the product o.f its services, but was
nwrPly paid a fep for its time and efforts-was decided
in favor of constitutional immunity in Livingston v.
Fnitt'd Htalt· . .·, 36-! U.S. 281, affirming, per curiam, 179
F. Supp. ~l (E.D.S.C.) 8

Tharl; case involved a management contract with the
.\tomic Energy Commission (A.E.G.). Under this contraet, the du Pont Company had agreed to construct and
operaJte .\.E.C. plants and facilities located in South
Carolina for the exclusive benefit of the United States .
.\ll the products produced or process·ed were at all times
owned by the United States, as were all o.f ·the equipment,
materials and supplies used in connection with such production. South Carolina's Tax Commission asserted that
duPont wa.~ liable for the paym·ent of sales or use taxes
upon the property it used on behalf of the United State'S.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a threejudge District Court which had held that in these circwnstancPs the South Carolina tax was a tax upon the
rnitPd State~, and not upon duPont.
It is true that in the Ltvingston case duPont received
no fee for its services and here Thiokol received a sub8. It is true that the reasoning of the Livingston C3Jse,
seems to have been rejected in United States v. Boyd,
363 S.W. 193 (Tenn. 1962), as appellants have indicated. (Br.
16-17.) The Boyd case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court.
(Docket No. 185, October Term 1963.)
tllpra.,
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stantial fee. But that distinction is imrnaterial, since the
fee received in rthe present case did not depend in any
way upon how successfully Thiokol utilized the Government's property. Thiokol could not use the Government's
property in this case in any way whi0h would result in its
"maximizing its prof~ts from them." Towllship of Muskegon, s~tpra. Indeed, the District Court in the LiV?'ugston case did not ground its decision on the absence of
reward for duPont's services, a matrter about which there
was some dispute. Irt held that, even if du Pont was
viewed as having received substantial consideration for
its services, it could not be taxed on the use of Government-owned property where, as here, the consideration
received by Thiokol was not related in any way to the
value or the tax-exemprt status of the property used.
The court the:r:e said, "In a sense, of course, du Pont
may be said to have the use of aU the materials and
facilities at ~the S1avannah River Plant, but in the same
sense it may be said that the individual members of the
AEC have the use of all of the f·acilities entrusted to their
care." 179 F. Supp., p. 23. We submit that here, too,
while Thiokol may be s:aid to have had the use and
possession of the Government's equipment, this use and
possession we:r:e no different from that which individual
employees of the A.E.C. or pos~t office have of the facilities entrusted to their care. Accordingly, if SeCJtion 5913-73, U.C.A., which requires "possession or other beneficial use" is applied to this case despirte the facl that
Thiokol cannot derive any pecuniary benefit from the
use of Governm·ent property, such an application is unconstitutional because Thiokol has no taxable interest in
the property.
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CO~CLUSION

'rhe judgment of the trial court is correct insofar
a~ it lwld that SPdion 59-13-73 U.C.A. had been applied
in ~ueh n m.anner as to diseriminate against the United
Stuh·~ and those with whmn it dealt. The trial court
erred in failing to declare that ( 1) the lesser tax imposed
on u:wr~ of ~tatP land under Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. rendl'l'4't l the higher tax imposed on users of federal propPrty under Section 59-13-73 U.C.A. unconstitutional, (2)
Thiokol had no interest in the property which Section
59-13-7:~ purports to or could constitutionally tax.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS F. OBERDORFER
Assistant Attorney General
LEE A. JACKSON
I. HENRY KU'T'Z
WIDLTAM MASS.AR
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C., 20530
\VILLI.:\~[ T. THURMAN
F nifed States Attorney

\YALKER E. ANDERS.ON
J..;;si~"ta nt r nitcd States Attorney
Federal Building
Salt Lake Citv Utah
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APPENDIX
6 Utah Code Annotated (1953) :

SEC. 59-2-2. State lands - hnprorcmeJifs
taxable. - No tax shall be levied upon lands, the
title to which remains in the state, held or orenpied by any person under a contract of sale or
lease from the state, but this provision shall not
be cons,trued to prevent the tax'ation of improvements on such lands and an interest therein to the
extent of money paid, or due, in part payment of
the purchase price thereof, whether an e~tension .
df payment has be~en granted or not prior to the
levy of such tax. Where final payment has been
made upon such lands, the contract ~of sales shall,
for the purpose of taxation, be regarded as passing title to the purchaser or assignee, and the
state land board shall immediately certify the
receipt of such final payment to the state tax
commission.
* * * *

6 Utah Code Annotated (1953, 1963 Pocket Supp) :

SEC. 59-13-73. Privilege tax upon possession
and use of tax-exempt property.- Exceptions.From and after the ·elffective date of this act there
is imposed ~and there shall be collected a tax upon
the posseBsion or other beneficial use enjoyed by
any private individual, association, or corporation
of any property, real or personal, whi'Ch for an~·
r-eason is exempt from taxation, when such proper-ty is used in connection with a business conducted for profit, except where the use is by way of
a concession in or relative to the use of a public
airport. park, fair ground, or similar property
which is available as a matter right to the use of
the general public, or where the possessor or user
is a religious, educational or charitaJble organization or the proceeds af such use or possession in-
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urt- to the lu.•rwfit of ~twit religion~, educational
or charitah!P organization and not to the benefit
of any other individual association or corporation.
~ o tax shall be imposed upon the possession or
other beneficial use of public lands occupied under the tPnns of mineral or grazing leases or permits isstlPd by the United States or the State of
tT tah or upon any easement unless the lease, permil or easement entitles the lessee or permittee
to rxrlusive possession of the premises to which
the lease, permi~t or easement relates.
(Amended 1959.)
HEC. 59-13-74. Rate of t,ax same as ad valorproperty tax - Credit against t,ax on use of
fedcrally-ou·ncd property. - The tax imposed
upon such possession or other beneficial use of
tax-exen1pt property shall be in the same amount
and to the same extent as the ad valorem property
ta.~ would be if the possessor or user were the
owner the roof; provided that there shall be credi tPd against the tax so imposed upon the benefirial use of property owned by the federal govPrnment the amount of .any payments which are
made in lieu of taxes.
fill

(Amended 1959.)
~EC. 59-13-77. Exemptions granted in other
sections not limi-ted or repealed. - Nothing contained herein shall he construed as limiting or
repealing the exemptions granted in sec.tions 592--t 59-:2-5, 59-2-6, 59-2-7' 59-2-8, 59-2-9 59-2-12
and 59-2-13 Utah Code Annotated 1953. '

(An1ended 1959.)
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